w w w . b r e n t o n p r i e s t l e y . c o m

Does Law Help or Hinder the Market? (2004)
Brenton Priestley



Does law help or hinder the market? In order to grapple satisfactorily with such an open-ended challenge, this discussion will survey a wide spectrum of critical analyses from legal and economic standpoints examining the relationship between the law and the market.

For the purposes of this discussion, the definitions of market and law will be necessarily broad. ‘Law’ will essentially comprise commercial law in all its global and local permutations, including its components (common law, civil law, legislation) and practitioners (lawyers, judges, legislators). The impact of the law in general (beyond commercial law) will also be touched on. ‘Market’ refers to the practices of those engaged in any significant trade of goods or services, from small businesses to multi-national corporations, and will even encompass illegal markets.

The discussion will begin by posing two questions. Does law help the market? Does law hinder the market? It will then move on to consider the surprising thesis that rather than helping or hindering, the law’s impact on the market is in fact negligible. Finally, the discussion will attempt to draw together the arguments and pass some kind of judgement on whether law in fact should help or should hinder the market.

‘Law is multi-faceted and contradictory,’ writes McBarnet. She could easily be referring to the market, as well. In attempting to glean patterns and trends about the interaction of such complex, diverse organisms, this discussion will inevitably sacrifice detail for breadth. Hopefully, however, a general picture will emerge about the relationship between the law and the market.


From the layman’s perspective, law would seem to help the market. After all, the purpose of the law is to create order and justice within society as a whole. It would be fair to assume that commercial law offers a framework that facilitates trade by promoting efficiency and trust and discouraging dishonesty and corruption through means such as contract law and trade practices legislation. This section will examine some of the arguments of those who contend that law helps the market.

Fundamentally, without an impartial legal system, the market would either descend into chaos or splinter into self-regulated, and inherently inefficient, corrupt factions. Although both outcomes have been disputed, there remain some staunch defenders of formalism, the ideal that a precise, rational, universal legal system will offer the greatest advantage for the market. In specifically contrasting the efficiency of the law to that of ‘group norms’, internal, ad hoc rules and customs, Posner argues that the law is ultimately more beneficial:

... [U]nder a variety of plausible conditions, the state – in particular, its legislatures and courts – produces rules that are more efficient than group norms and, furthermore, that help correct the deficiencies of group norms.

He argues that judges and legislators, who are presumably unbiased by the whims and pressures of the market, are far better placed to examine it objectively and determine overarching control mechanisms:

Legislatures use committees for aggregating information and voting rules... Courts rely on rules of evidence, appeal, and precedent to aggregate information and judgments and to minimize variance. None of these mechanisms is perfect; but they seem to be straightforward improvements over the anarchy of norm-production... When collective behavior depends heavily on information aggregation – as opposed to when enforcers can adequately rely on private information – legislatures and courts can be expected to use information more effectively in determining rules so that statutes and the common law are substantively superior, clearer, and more stable than norms.

While the position of law’s superiority to customs has been supported by some, others have argued that the strength of law is in supplementing custom. Law doesn’t hinder the market, but is only really helps indirectly. Rose writes that the law is

a reinforcer of the trust assurances of character, retaliation, and informal sanctions. Others have described legal remedies in a similar way, as a kind of backstop for more informal grounds of trust, particularly where informal assurances are difficult to establish.

It is worth noting that Benson similarly acknowledges the symbiosis of law and custom:

commercial law itself is analogous to the price system in that it facilitates interaction and makes exchange more efficient... Commercial law develops directly from the market exchange process as business practice and custom evolves.

His point is that the strength of commercial law derives not from its objective standpoint towards the market, but rather because it grows from it and therefore is directly relevant.

An alternative strand of commentary arguing for the value of law for the market focusses on lawyers, and their ability to act as transaction cost engineers. According to Gilson and Mnookin,

Lawyers can often create value, not just as business lawyers who serve as transaction cost engineers, but also as litigators who cooperate to facilitate efficient dispute resolution, and as process architects who design efficient systems to resolve conflict outside of court at low cost... lawyers can often create procedures and institutional structures that diminish the risks by either minimising asymmetries or aligning incentives.

Gilson’s work examining the importance of lawyers as facilitators, advisers and dispute resolvers within the market has been adopted by many commentators and used specifically to analyse the high-tech Silicon Valley computer industry. Lawyers were vital for the growth of the embryonic industry back in the late 1980s, not only because they offered vital legal services (contract, intellectual property) but because they brought with them ‘... elementary advice about such matters as record-keeping for tax and accounting purposes, and such basic legal services as the drafting of partnership agreements and secured financing documents.’ Furthermore, they could act as ‘all-purpose intermediaries, as links between entrepreneurs and financial sources, as well as between business and government agencies at all levels’. Likewise, Bernstein has isolated the factors why lawyers can have such value, especially for Silicon Valley:

(1) because information is often costly, unavailable or largely unverifiable; (2) because entrepreneurs and venture capitalists often have very different expectations about the risk and return associated with particular companies; (3) because the time horizons of venture capital funds and entrepreneurs may be different; and (4) because venture capital financing agreements are complicated and might require the parties to incur substantial transaction costs, it is not surprising that Silicon Valley lawyers are viewed favorably by their clients.

Like most commercial lawyers, ‘[t]he Silicon Valley lawyer... thinks of himself as... a legal engineer... [H]is job is to solve problems: to take a principle, a task, and "engineer" it legally, showing how it can be done, or done best’. Although the lawyer could be considered a help to the market, if his ultimate goal is to circumvent an obstacle – the law – can law truly be said to help the market? This leads onto the next question.


While Gilson illustrated the ways in which lawyers could add value to the market, the prevailing perspective is less optimistic:

What do lawyers contribute to... economical development? Much popular opinion assumes that the contribution is mostly negative, that the vast amounts of legal time billed to corporate enterprise... are the pathological symptoms of an over-regulated, excessively litigious culture that diverts resources from productivity and innovation into wasteful paper-pushing.

Likewise, Rose writes that lawyers

... insist that ordinary people get everything down on paper, thereby sowing seeds of discord and suspicion; [they] then figure out ways to weasel out of what look like clear directives, thriving on the very discord [they] have sown.

And to further belabour the point:

[L]awyers magnify the inherent divisiveness of dispute resolution. According to this vision, litigators rarely cooperate to resolve disputes efficiently. Instead, shielded by a professional ideology that is said to require zealous advocacy, they endlessly and wastefully fight in ways that enrich themselves but rarely advantage their clients.

The common refrain is that lawyers are ultimately leeches, parasites who suckle at the artery of commerce; in other words, a hindrance. Kostal’s study of law and the railway industry in 19th century England illustrates how the legal system essentially crippled the railways commercially. The majority of railway cases brought before the courts resulted in a finding against the railway, no matter what the facts of the case were. ‘The ability of the companies to marshal formidable legal firepower in virtually every lawsuit was not enough to alter the unmistakable and remorseless anti-railway drift of the law’. Unsurprisingly, lawyers didn’t miss the opportunity to take advantage of the circumstances:

The range of lucrative opportunity that the railway movement presented to English lawyers was staggeringly large... [their] zeal... for mining this wealth, at whatever sacrifice to professional decorum, alarmed even some legal journals.

From 19th century England to contemporary United States, it is clear that little has changed:

[B]ig corporations... are constantly besieged by private lawsuits of every kind, energetically pressed by lawyers eager for their contingency fees... Almost two million lawsuits against corporations are started each year in Federal and State courts.

And it isn’t just private individuals, represented by lawyers, who hinder the market,

business big and small must also contend with the suits pressed by local State and Federal authorities, charging environmental, occupational safety, consumer protection, financial and, of course, anti-trust violations.

These comments are echoed by McBarnet:

Laws have been introduced ostensibly to provide individual right for the less powerful in society or to protect collective interests against the absolute rights of property or the absolute right of business to pursue profit maximisation. Health and safety codes, pollution regulations, rent control and anti-discrimination legislation are good examples.

The prime concern of lawyers employed by businesses is in avoiding the law, finding loopholes, settling rather than litigating, avoiding the courts. ‘The legal system,’ Hedley writes, ‘is not necessarily the solution to business disputes; it is in large measure part of the problem, and knowledge of the legal system is used to limit that problem’.

McBarnet discusses in detail the ways in which the law is malleable, and how talented lawyers manipulate it to their clients’ advantage. Tax avoidance is an industry unto itself. She also argues that not only is the law easily circumvented by the market, but it is fundamentally flawed from the beginning, ‘an inadequate compromise riddled with exemptions and loopholes and lacking the teeth to give it any chance of success... law is just too slow to keep up with the pace of changing social and economic reality’.

Furthermore, according to Watson, lawmakers have little incentive to make the law more helpful for the market. After all, lawyers

earn their living by the law. A change that made the law simpler or less ambiguous or reduced the volume of disputes, actual or possible, could have an adverse effect on their income. In addition, the stock-in-trade of a practicing lawyer is his... knowledge of the existing law. A drastic change could reduce the most experienced practitioner almost to the level of a beginner.

On the balance of the arguments examined so far, then, it could be said that the law helps the market only in infrequent and limited ways. At the same time, aspects of law have a negative impact on market behaviour and tend to cause far more problems than they solve, with lawyers as the beneficiaries.

However, with so much effort spent in avoiding the law and minimising its impact, the sheer complexity of much of commercial law, and the difficulties of enforcing it, how much impact does the law truly have on the market?


A popular school of thought argues that law’s impact on the market is essentially insignificant. ‘The overwhelming preponderance of evidence,’ Gava writes, ‘suggests that the law plays a minor role in market transactions’.

A touchstone for the study of non-use of the law by the market remains Macaulay’s research. Conducted initially in the United States during the 1960s, Macaulay discovered that ‘[n]ot only are contract and contract law not needed in many situations, their use may have, or may be thought to have, undesirable consequences’. The contracts used by the businessmen that Macaulay interviewed were frequently contradictory and often unenforceable, there was a widespread dependence on mutual trust and non-legal sanctions for breach. Their use of law was mainly restricted to the kind of supplementary role discussed by Rose earlier.

Further inquiries have demonstrated that Macaulay’s findings aren’t necessarily merely symptomatic of the specific era and circumstances in which he conducted his research. The non-use of law – especially contract law – has been illustrated in research of markets ranging from railway companies and suppliers to the US chemical industry.

White’s research into the latter is empirical, informative, and supportive of Macaulay’s thesis. ‘Contract law,’ he writes, ‘is a much less significant determinant of commercial behavior in complex transactions that the typical... lawyer dares believe’ White uncovered

... considerable evidence that lawyers were diligent in attempting to interpret the law, were careful to advise their clients, but found little evidence there was any significant change in any company’s behaviour in response to the law.

Palay’s study of railway companies and suppliers provided similar results, demonstrating a wide-spread dependence on trust and non-legal sanctions, and a reluctance to ‘exploit short-term advantages if it would lead to harm in the long-run relation’ As Deakin puts it,

firms frequently dispense with formal planning and make little recourse to the law to resolve contractual disputes, preferring flexibility as a basis for long-term co-operation... effective contractual performance rests less upon the strong assertion of legal rights than upon a set of diffuse and open-ended obligations and assumptions which may be summed up in the idea of ‘trust’.

In other words, it is clear that non-legal customs and norms wield considerable influence from throughout markets. And when custom guides market interaction, then clearly the law’s influence is diminished. Hedley elaborates on how a trust relationship yields such custom:

[W]hen we consider law and alternatives to law within a particular sub-group of traders, there is a close connection between the cohesion of this group and the desirability of legal remedies. The smaller the group and the better the members know one another and one another’s business, the more amenable the members are to methods other than the law for the resolution of disputes between them. Mutual trust is greater, finding arbitrators both sides to a dispute can trust is easier too; and, most powerfully, nobody dares escalate a dispute with someone who is very likely to be a potential business client in the near future.

In some cases, the trust relations and customs of some markets have spawned miniature legal systems that have virtually eclipsed the law. Bernstein’s research into some of these private legal systems (NYC diamond traders, the cotton industry) proves to be particularly interesting, and illustrate how self-contained and effective such independent mechanisms can be. Likewise, studies of markets as diverse as the New York Stock Exchange during the 19th century and Maghribi traders during the 11th century further illustrate the extent to which markets can self-regulate.


Illegal markets, by definition, operate outside of the law. Therefore, examining their relationship with the law is particularly fascinating, and directly relevant to the question at hand. Although buyers and sellers alike can face criminal punishment if caught engaging in illegal trade, the benefits of trading in prohibited markets are so high that for many, the risks are a minor consideration. In a perverse way, then, law may be seen to help illegal markets – by prohibiting goods or services, whether alcohol, narcotics or gambling, the law immediately creates a profitable market. That the production and distribution vacuum is invariably filled by organised crime is inevitable.

A specific example may serve to further illustrate the inability of the law affect the market. According to the facts of United States of America v Reuben Sturman:

From his home state of California, Reuben Sturman operated a nationwide wholesale and retail adult entertainment business for over thirty years. His power and influence was such that many in the industry believed that he was the industry. Sturman had substantial control over distribution of adult videos and magazines and marital aids.

Much of the adult entertainment industry was illegal during the early 1960s, when Sturman started out, and it wasn’t long before he was indicted for the felony of distributing obscenity.

Sturman pleaded not guilty to the federal obscenity charge. Then he sued J. Edgar Hoover and the F.B.I. for violating his constitutional rights. In 1967, the Supreme Court ruled [for Sturman]. The suit against [Hoover] was dismissed... but Reuben Sturman had made his point: He was not afraid of the F.B.I. or of the federal government.

Under state laws, Sturman eventually faced obscenity indictments in California, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Ohio. He hired First Amendment attorneys, and won every case... [t]he content grew more explicit with each victory in court.

Sturman operated a complicated system of Swiss bank accounts and Canadian business fronts that effectively allowed him to remain in business for decades. The point is clear; the law was nearly powerless to stop Sturman from taking advantage of an illegal market, circumventing the law to his own advantage, and eventually becoming ‘... the wealthiest man in the state of Ohio’. If the law is unable to effectively control illicit markets, how can it hope to regulate legitimate ones?


Law, then, seems to have only a minor impact on the market. Irrespective of the quotidian reality of the law/market relationship, a vital question remains. Should law affect the market? If so, should it help it or hinder it? Is a market unrestrained by the law a good thing?

Those who believe that law should help the market generally argue along the functionalist, anti-formalist lines of Llewellyn, that commercial law should derive from market custom and practice rather than from an abstract, objective legal standpoint. Brownsword argues for a ‘dynamic market individualism,’ that ‘reflect[s] the practice and expectations of the contracting community (particularly the business community)’ and continues to evolve along with market practice. As White puts it, ‘lawmakers must be more willing to make the law conform to the sensible practices of business and to accept the fact that the law is incapable of changing those practices except at great cost’.

However, there are detractors from the functionalist standpoint. Firstly, there are those who argue that custom is so idiosyncratic that ‘even if courts did have the capacity to identify custom there is no useful business custom for it to discover’ Nor is custom flawless, it ‘sometimes harms efficiency by excluding new entrants from trading or by achieving price collusion... [and] can overflow into criminal violence’.

Gava offers a particularly convincing case against functionalism, and essentially argues that law should hinder the market. Although specifically discussing contract, his comments are applicable to the wider commercial law:

Contract deserves to survive because of the service it may offer to a world where an unholy alliance between the market and bureaucratic government has unleashed the destructive forces of turbo-capitalism... Those who argue for a more utilitarian, functional law of contract should realise that this will inevitably destroy a potential institutional counterweight to the menace of an out-of-control market.

Luttwak argues along similar lines, and even suggests that the parasitic, litigious lawyers decried by the market in fact help to effect an equilibrium between the market and the populace.

The epitome of this can be seen in Bill Lerach, a lawyer in the United States who made his fortune bringing class-action lawsuits against large corporations, and recently made the headlines when he sued Enron. Toobin writes that up until now,

Lerach has been reviled by his targets, many of which are highly reputable firms like Intel and Apple, which view him as little better than a skilled extortionist, using the legal system to harass them. But Lerach has become a hero of the political left; a recent story in The Nation suggested that he was "America’s top corporate crime fighter."

Although the work of Lerach and class-action lawyers like him is inherently self-serving (and obscenely lucrative), it nonetheless serves on the front-line of reining in the excesses of turbo-capitalism.

On the basis of the last decade or so, Lerach may have as great an influence on the regulation of public companies as Congress and the President... Lerach’s case against Enron illustrates, for better or worse, the result of relying on private lawyers to do the public’s business of policing corporate America.

Whether one thinks that law should help or hinder the market is, of course, largely dependent on one’s perspective. Lawyers, judges and business operators will all be swayed by their own career interests. However, based on the arguments surveyed here, it seems clear that a market monitored carefully by an objective legal system will offer society at large more benefits than a legal system with the market’s interests at the forefront of its concerns.


Any conclusions drawn from this discussion must be pre-empted with a caveat. Attempts to synthesise a coherent ideology out of the diverse body of critical literature examined is nigh on impossible. And, ultimately, the market and the law are too complex in their interactions to make anything but broad generalisations about them. Gava poses a question that deftly summarises the quandary:

Is it possible that each market has its own idiosyncrasies or particular attributes and that these will have an impact on the relationship between the market and the common law and of possible private systems? If it is does this mean it is misleading to speak of commercial law – that there may be many "dialects" or even "languages" of commercial law?

However, in examining whether law helps or hinders the market, common themes have clearly emerged. Firstly, despite the claims of a few detractors, traditional law is limited in its ability to help the market, and in many ways can be seen as a hindrance. However, in the broader scheme of things, the law’s impact on the market is more muted that common perception would suggest, and much effort is expended in avoiding and circumventing the law. In terms of whether the market should be helped or hindered by the law, the law should adopt a cautious attitude towards pro-market judicial activism and regulate business in a way that benefits broader society’s best interests.



Doreen McBarnet, ‘Legal Creativity: Law Capital and Legal Avoidance’ in M. Cain and C. Harrington (eds), Lawyers in a Postmodern World: Translation and Transgression (1994), 73. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004), 689.

Cf Alan Watson, ‘Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture' in Alan Watson (ed), Legal Origins and Legal Change (1991). Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004), 31.

Eric A. Posner, ‘Law, Economics and Inefficient Norms’ (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1697. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 431, 432.

Ibid 452.

See also David Charny, ‘The New Formalism in Contract’ (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law Review 842. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004), 315.

Carol Rose, ‘Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal’ (1995) 75 Boston University Law Review 531. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 225, 233.

Carol Rose, ‘Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal’ (1995) 75 Boston University Law Review 531. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 225, 233.

Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin, ‘Foreward: Business Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients’ (1995) 74 Oregon Law Review, 7. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004)667, 668-9.

Lawrence M. Friedman et al, ‘Law, Lawyers, and Legal Practice in Silicon Valley: A Preliminary Report’ (1989) 64 Indiana Law Review 555. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 654, 656.

Lisa Bernstein, ‘The Silicon Valley Lawyer as a Transaction Cost Engineer?’ (1995) 74 Oregon Law Review 239. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 672, 674.

Friedman, et al, above n 9, 661.

Ibid 654.

Rose, above n 6, 225.

Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin, ‘Cooperation and Conflict between Lawyers in Litigation’ (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review 509. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 617A, 618.

R. V. Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism 1825-1975 (1994). Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 632, 633.

Ibid 632.

Edward Luttwak, Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy (1998). Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 637, 649.

Ibid 650.

McBarnet, above n 1, 689.

S. Hedley "The ‘Needs of Commercial Litigants’ in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Contract Law" (1997) 18 Legal History 85. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 152, 155.

McBarnet, above n1, 690.

Watson, above n 2, 56.

John Gava, ‘Is Privity Worth Defending?’ in P Kincaid (ed) Privity: Private Justice or Public Regulation? (2001) 199. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 772, 786.

Steward Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ 28 American Sociological Review 55. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 124, 130

Thomas Palay ‘Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting’ (1984) 13 Journal of Legal Studies 265. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 161.

James J. White, ‘Contract Law in Modern Commercial Transactions, an Artifact of Twentieth Century Business Life?’ (1982) 22 Washburn Law Journal 1. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 133.


Ibid 150.

Palay, above n 25, 170.

Simon Deakin, et al, ‘"Trust" or Law? Towards an Integrated Theory of Contractual Relations between Firms’ (1994) 21 Journal of Law and Society 329. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 237.

Hedley, above n 20, 155.

Lisa Bernstein, ‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’ (1992) 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 191.

Lisa Bernstein, ‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions’ (2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1724. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 340.

Although not necessarily completely empirically sound. See esp Jason Scott Johnston ‘Should the Law Ignore Commercial Norms? A Comment on the Bernstein Conjecture and its Relevance for Contract Law Theory and Reform’ (2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1791. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 381.

Stuart Banner, ‘The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1792-1860’ (1998) 27 Journal of Legal Studies 113. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 80.

Avner Greif, ‘Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition’ (1983) 83 American Economic Review 525. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 62.

The illegal narcotics trade constituted over eight percent of international trade as long ago as 1997. Alfred McCoy ‘From Free Trade to Prohibition: A Critical History of the Modern Asian Opium Trade’ (2000) Fordham Urban Law Journal 28, 309.

93 CR 167 2527 (Ill, 1995).

Ibid 2527.

Eric Schlosser ‘Empire of the Obscene’ (2003) March 10 The New Yorker 61, 62.

Sturman was ultimately imprisoned on tax evasion and extortion charges in old age.

Ibid 61.

See esp Hugh Collins Regulating Contracts (1999) 356-61. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 765-61.

Robert Brownsword, ‘Static and Dynamic Market Individualism’ in R. Halson (ed) Exploring the Boundaries of Contract (1996) 49. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 281, 282.

White, above n 26, 151.

Lisa Bernstein, ‘The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study’ (1999) 66 University of Chicago Law Review 710. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 332, 337.

John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, ‘Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order’ (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2422. Reprinted in John Gava (ed), Commercial Law and the Market Course Reader (2004) 247, 249.

Gava, above n 23, 805.

Luttwak, above n 17, 653.

Jeffrey Toobin ‘The Man Chasing Enron’ (2002) September 9 The New Yorker 86.


John Gava, Commercial Law and the Market Study Guide (2004) 15.

feedback.gif (356 bytes)

free page hit counter